In March 2024, there was the first reported outbreak of a highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza (HPAI) clade 2.3.4.4b virus in dairy cows in the United States. Since then, there have been several spillover events to cats, poultry, and humans. Multiple reports have discovered infectious virus in raw milk from infected dairy cows. Infectious virus can also last over a period on milking machine surfaces as a potential route of spread in cattle and contamination in raw milk. While the U.S. Food and Drug Administration has cleared commercial pasteurized milk as safe for consumption given the lack of infectious virus, there have been numerous reports that up to 30 percent of commercial milk tested were positive for HPAI H5N1 influenza virus genome copies. This is not necessarily unique to the HPAI H5N1 virus, as retrospective studies have identified H1N1 and H3N2 seropositivity in cows linked to decreased milk production. However, it is unknown how repeat exposure to the remaining viral proteins and genomic material in pasteurized milk modulates immune responses once ingested. We developed a successful in-house pasteurization protocol that inactivated high viral loads of the pandemic H1N1 strain A/California/04/2009 (Cal09) or bovine-derived HPAI H5N1 (A/bovine/Ohio.B24OSU-439/2024) viruses in raw milk. Mice were administered this milk daily for five days and rechallenged with each respective virus. We found that repeated oral exposure to inactivated virus was not sufficient to prevent or accelerate mortality from lethal challenge of HPAI H5N1, though it did result in a ～0.5 log10 reduction viral titers in the brain and delayed clinical signs. In contrast, oral gavage of mice with pre-existing immunity to H1N1 influenza virus with virus pasteurized in milk were protected from morbidity and mortality upon bovine H5N1 viral challenge. These findings suggest that ingestion of inactivated HPAI H5N1 has limited potential health risk and does not prevent protective immune history-mediated responses to lethal infection.